Conflict of Laws, Product Liability and the Substantive Law of New Zealand in Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp. by Barlow, Patricia
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review
Volume 7
Number 1 Fall 1983 Article 4
1-1-1983
Conflict of Laws, Product Liability and the
Substantive Law of New Zealand in Bennett v.
Enstrom Helicopter Corp.
Patricia Barlow
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_international_comparative_law_review
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please
contact wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Patricia Barlow, Conflict of Laws, Product Liability and the Substantive Law of New Zealand in Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 7
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 125 (1983).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_international_comparative_law_review/vol7/iss1/4
Conflict of Laws, Product Liability and
the Substantive Law of New Zealand in
Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.
By PATRICIA BARLOW*
M-4., University of Auckland, Auckland, New Zealand; LLB., Universit, of
Auckland Law School; LLM, McGill University, Montreal, Canada.
I. INTRODUCTION
The New Zealand tort system is unique and innovative in its
means of compensating accident victims or their dependents in the case
of death.' This system of compensation is embodied in the New Zea-
land Accident Compensation Act (1972)2 (ACA), which came into
* Special thanks must be extended to Professor Martin A. Bradley of the Institute of
Air and Space Law, McGill University, Montreal, for reading the draft of this article. I am,
however, solely responsible for any remaining error.
I. This system is unique in that compensation is not fault-dependent. While nonfault
compensation provisions are used in automobile liability and workers' compensation stat-
utes in the United States and throughout the Commonwealth, the New Zealand statute ex-
tends this to all cases of death or personal injury due to accident.
2. No. 43, 1 N.Z. Stat. 521 (1972) as amendedby the Accident Compensation Amend-
ment Act (No. 2), No. 113, 1 N.Z. Stat. 829 (1973) [hereinafter cited as ACA]:
An Act to make provision for safety and the prevention of accidents; for the reha-
bilitation and compensation of persons who suffer personal injury by accident in
respect of which they have cover under this Act; for the compensation of certain
dependents of those persons where death results from the injury and for the aboli-
tion as far as practicable of actions for damages arising directly or indirectly out of
personal injury by accident and death resulting therefrom and certain other
actions.
The impetus for this reform in the law of personal injury liability came primarily from two
National (Conservative) Government Ministers, the Honorable Messrs. T.P. Shand and R.
Hanan. In 1963 they established a committee to examine the question of application of this
principle to liability for motor vehicle accidents. This attempt being a failure, Mr. Shand
saw this as an area of the law for which a Royal Commission of Inquiry would be an appro-
priate investigatory body. In 1966 a Royal Commission of Inquiry was set up under the
chairmanship of Mr. Justice Woodhouse (now Sir Owen). This Commission's Report. Com-
pensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand--Report of the Rozl Commision of Inquiry,
also referred to as The Woodhouse Report, resulted in the enactment of the Accident Com-
pensation Act in its present form. Notable among the recommendations of The Woodhouse
Report was that all injured persons should receive a uniform method of assessment, irre-
spective of the cause of the injury. For a full account of the legislative history of the ACA
see Mathieson, Royal Commission of Inquiry: Conpesationfor Personal Injury in New Zea-
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force on April 1, 1974. The Act provides a uniform system of rehabili-
tation and compensation for personal injury or death resulting from
accident in New Zealand. It replaced the two earlier sources of com-
pensation found in the Workers' Compensation Act (1956) 3 and the
common law, in which recovery of full compensation depended upon
proof of negligence, with a statutory nonfault system based on eighty
percent compensation limited to a maximum amount.' While the new
system of compensation guarantees recovery, the quidpro quo is a ceil-
ing on the recoverable amount and a limitation on the compensation
allowed for lost earnings.'
One of the most noted features of the ACA is that it abolishes the
common-law right to bring proceedings for compensatory damages
6
based on either tort or contract.' This right, however, is not abolished
when the ACA does not apply or when proceedings are brought outside
New Zealand.' While certain provisions of the ACA have been the
land, 31 MOD. L. REv. 544 (1968); Palmer, Compensationfor Personal Injury: A Requiemfor
the Common Law in New Zealand, 21 AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1973); Palmer, Abolishing the
PersonalInjury Tort System. The New Zealand Experience, 9 ALBERTA L. REV. 169 (1971);
Palmer & Lemons, Toward the Disappearance o/Tort Law-New Zealand'r New Compensa-
tion Plan, U. ILL. L.F. 693 (1972); Note, Compensationfor Personal Inury in New Zealand,
18 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 191 (1969). For analysis of the provisions of the ACA see Harris,
Accident Compensation in New Zealand 4 Comprehensive Insurance System, 37 MOD, L,
REv. 361 (1974); Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand- The First Two Years, 25
AM. J. CoMP. L. 1 (1977). See also Miller, Compensationfor Personal lnjury: Social Insur-
ance and Comparative Perspective, 4 CoMP. L. Y.B. 221 (1980).
3. No. 62, 16 N.Z. REPR. STAT. 799 (1956). In a workers' compensation claim, recov-
ery was dependent on establishing that the accident arose "out of and in the course of em-
ployment." See Workers' Compensation Act § 3 (1956). The Workers' Compensation
Amendment Act, however, No. 125, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1008, § 2A(I) (1972), provides that the Act
no longer applies to cases of personal injury or death due to accident.
4. See ACA § 113. In December 1981 the New Zealand Government announced that
the maximum earnings-related compensation was to be increased from NZ$288 per week to
NZ$600 per week (NZ$31,200 per year). See Vennell, The Accident Compensation System
and The M. Erebus Claims: The Effects of Inflation on Damages Awards, 1982 RECENT LAW
295, 297.
5. Vennell, supra note 4, at 297.
6. A claimant compensated under the ACA still has a common law right to bring pro-
ceedings for punitive damages arising out of the same event. See Donselaar v. Donselaar,
[1982] 1 N.Z.L.R. 97, 111 (N.Z. Ct. App.), where the court cited with approval the Texas
Supreme Court's decision of Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d
397 (1934). In Fort Worth Elevators, punitive damages were allowed in addition to compen-
sation awarded under the Workmen's Compensation insurance legislation. In New Zea-
land, recovery of punitive damages is excluded in fatal cases by section 3 of the Law Reform
Act, No. 31, 17 N.Z. REPR. STAT. 809 (1936), but would be available in a nonfatal personal
injury claim.




subject of extensive academic comment and judicial review,9 the pri-
vate international law provisions, which apply when proceedings are
brought outside New Zealand, have received little commentI0 and only
recently have become the subject of judicial interpretation.I
This Article examines how the private international law provisions
apply in aviation product liability. All aircraft which operate in New
Zealand are manufactured overseas. Most are manufactured in the
United States. Consequently, if the operation of a defective aircraft
causes injury or death in New Zealand, the private international law
provisions would apply.12 This Article will focus on the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Bennett v. En-
strom Helicopter Corp. 13
Bennett arose out of a fatal helicopter accident in New Zealand
and was a classic products liability action against the Michigan corpo-
ration that manufactured the allegedly defective product which, the
plaintiff asserted, caused the accident.
Under Michigan law, the lex loci delicti rule applied in plaintiff's
tort claim. 4 On the basis of this rule, both the trial court and the ap-
pellate court held that the substantive law of New Zealand applied and
that the "exclusive remedy" provisions of the ACA controlled liability.
The courts held that since compensation had already been awarded
under the ACA, no further claim could be sustained.
This Article submits that both the trial court and the appellate
court, in holding that the ACA was the exclusive remedy, misinter-
preted the substantive law of New Zealand on recovery for personal
injury or death. The ACA left intact the common-law right of recovery
9. Sections 153-69 of the ACA make provision for a review, with a hearing, to the
Accident Compensation Commission which is set up under section 6 to administer the legis-
lation. There is a right of appeal to the High Court and the New Zealand Court of Appeal.
See Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand- The first Two Years, .stura note 2, at
4-5 (the writer lists the problem areas of interpretation in the first two years of the ACA's
operation).
10. For a brief comment see Webb & Auburn, New Zealand Conflict of Laws-A Bird's
Eye New, 26 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 971, 983-84 (1977).
11. Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 679 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1982).
12. While the doctrine offorum non conveniens can be a formidable barrier to recovery
in a United States court, discussion relating to this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
13. 679 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1982).
14. Bennett v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., No. M75-59CA2, slip op. (W.D. Mich. Nov.
12, 1980), (citing Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 172 N.W.2d 137 (1969); Wingert v.
Wayne Circuit Judge, 101 Mich. 395, 59 N.W. 662 (1894)). The lex loci delicti rule is that
the law of the country where the wrong took place is the substantive law to be applied to the
case. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (5th ed. 1979).
19831
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in the case of wrongful death caused by negligence' 5 if there is no cov-
erage under the ACA, or if there is coverage but the right to bring such
proceedings in a foreign court is not precluded. Bennett falls into this
latter category of "concurrent recovery." It is on this basis that the
submission is made that the Bennett court's decision was premised on a
misinterpretation of the substantive law of New Zealand.
This Article will consider the conclusions of both the trial and ap-
pellate courts in Bennett and will examine the substantive law of New
Zealand applicable in a wrongful death case. The discussion focuses
on the ACA provisions which state the statutory test that must be satis-
fied before proceedings may be brought in a foreign court when com-
pensation has already been awarded under the ACA. The common-
law rules which survived the enactment of the ACA will also be ana-
lyzed. The statutory test is then applied to the facts of Bennett. This
application outlines the potential liability of a foreign manufacturer for
defective products which cause death or personal injury in New Zea-
land. Also, it illustrates the procedure available to the Accident Com-
pensation Commission in exercising its right of indemnity under
private international law provisions of the ACA. Finally, this Article
considers the application of foreign law in United States federal courts.
II. BENNETT P. ENSTROM HELICOPTER CORP.
The fatal accident which gave rise to the action in Bennett oc-
curred in New Zealand during the course of a demonstration flight,
due, as the plaintiff argued, to the defective helicopter manufactured in
Michigan by the defendant corporation. Under the district court's di-
versity jurisdiction, the plaintiff, on behalf of the estate of the deceased,
sought damages under the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute16 on
counts of negligence, breach of both express and implied warranty of
fitness, and breach of implied duty of care owed to a bailee.
The court applied the Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manqfacturing
Co. 17 principle that in a diversity case the federal court is required to
apply the conflict of laws doctrine of the forum state.' 8 Relying upon
15. See infra text accompanying notes 28-41. See also Vennell, Residual Liabilities
Under the New ZealandAccident Compensation Scheme, AUSTRALIAN INS. INST. J. 14 (1980)
(the writer shows that there are clearly areas of residual liability remaining where recovery is
based on negligence).
16. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1982).
17. 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
18. 679 F.2d at 631.
(Vol. 7
Conffict of Laws
Michigan authority, the district court19 maintained that the lex loci
delicti rule was to be applied in such a tort action20 unless it would
frustrate an announced Michigan public policy.2' The court concluded
that the mere fact of manufacture of the helicopter in Michigan was
insufficient reason to apply Michigan law under the public policy
exception.22
Since the lex loci delicti rule was to govern the case, the court had
to establish the substantive law of New Zealand relevant to the facts
before it. The trial court relied on an affidavit from a former Prime
Minister of New Zealand, Sir John Marshall, and concluded that the
ACA was the plaintiff's "exclusive remedy." In reaching its conclusion
that this was a "correct statement of the applicable law of New Zea-
land," the court relied on the following part of the affidavit: "In these
circumstances no proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly
out of the death of Edwin H. Bennett can be brought by any person
under any law of New Zealand or any enactment in any court in New
Zealand."'2 This conclusion that the ACA was the exclusive remedy
was affirmed on appeal by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
24
Arguing on appeal that the district court had misconstrued the
ACA or "erred in applying New Zealand law,"'25 the plaintiff empha-
sized section 5(1) of the ACA which only excluded an action brought in
New Zealand even though compensation already had been received
under ACA. The court, while endorsing this argument by recognizing
that the New Zealand legislature could not restrict the jurisdiction of
other sovereign states, did not, however, accept the plaintiff's argument
that since there was no longer a common-law tort action under New
Zealand law, the Michigan Wrongful Death Statute should be
applied.
26
The argument that the Michigan statute should be the basis of the
action must be rejected simply because the whole case proceeded on a
19. No. M75-59CA2, slip op. (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1980).
20. Abenschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 172 N.W.2d 137 (1969), Wingert v. Wayne
Circuit Judge, 101 Mich. 395, 59 N.W. 662 (1894).
21. Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978). InBennell, the plain-
tiff argued that an announced public policy in Michigan was safety in aeronautics. 679 F.2d
at 632.
22. No. M75-59CA2, slip op. at 5 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 12, 1980).
23. Id at2.
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misconception that the ACA is an exclusive remedy in a case involving
wrongful death, which it is not.
III. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF NEW ZEALAND IN A
CASE OF PERSONAL INJURY OR DEATH
The substantive law of New Zealand for the recovery of damages
in personal injury or wrongful death cases has two sources: the ACA
and the common law tort of negligence.27 Most claims that result from
accidents occurring in New Zealand will be covered by the provisions
of the ACA to the exclusion of a common law action.28 In the follow-
ing situations, however, the ACA is not applicable and the common
law of negligence governs.
A. When recovery is specifically excluded under the provisions of
the ACA
The majority of the claims on behalf of the passengers who lost
their lives in the disaster at Mt. Erebus, Antarctica in November 1979
came within this category. The New Zealand passengers on that fatal
flight were on domestic carriage as defined by the New Zealand Car-
riage by Air Act, 1967,29 but coverage under the ACA was excluded by
section 150A. Section 105A 30 states that the ACA is applicable only to
injuries occurring within three hundred nautical miles of New Zealand.
The Mt. Erebus accident occurred beyond that limit. Therefore, the
ACA did not apply and the absolute liability31 of the carrier, Air New
Zealand, was limited to the sum of NZ$42,000,000, 32 except in the case
of willful misconduct. 33 The basis for recovery was the common-law
27. The term "common law" as used here to refers to the common law as modified by
statute.
28. ACA § 5(l).
29. No. 151, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1218 (1967).
30. Where any person has cover under this Act, not being a seaman or airman in
the course of his employment as such, embarks in New Zealand on a ship or air-
craft or other means of conveyance by sea or air to travel from one place in New
Zealand to another place in New Zealand or to return to his place of embarkation
without disembarking at any other place, but in either case does not go beyond a
limit of 300 nautical miles from any point or points in New Zealand, that person
shall, for the purpose of this Act be deemed to have remained in New Zealand.
New Zealand Carriage by Air Act § 105A, No. 151, 2 N.Z. Stat. 1218 (1967), as amended by
Accident Compensation Amendment Act § 9, No. 36, 1 N.Z. Stat. 296 (1978).
31. Carriage by Air Act § 22.
32. Id § 28.
33. Id § 31. The Act adopts the same principle of recovery beyond the limit provided
for in section 28 as it applies to international carriage as stated in part 1 of the same statute,
[Vol. 7
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tort of negligence under the provisions of the Law Reform Act (193 6), 34
the Deaths by Accidents Compensation Act (1952),"3 and the Carriage
by Air Act (1967).
B. When the injuring event occurred before the ACA came into
force in 1974 but the actual injury was not manifest until
after that date36
C. When the injury occurred outside New Zealand due to a
defective product manufactured in New Zealand
The overseas consumer would have a cause of action against a
New Zealand manufacturer.37
D. When the injury occurred in New Zealand with coverage under
the ACA, but the section 131 test for bringing a claim in
a foreign court is satisfied
If there is additional recovery in a foreign court, the Accident
Compensation Commission is given discretionary power to deduct the
amount paid under the ACA from that recovered in the foreign court.38
An example of a group of claimants that fall into this category is the
Air New Zealand crew in the Mt. Erebus DC-10 disaster. The crew,
having coverage under the ACA,39 is pursuing a claim against the
United States Government for the breach of duty of care by the
McMurdo Sound air traffic controllers, who were members of the
United States Navy. If this claim is successful, the Accident Compen-
sation Commission could exercise its discretionary power under section
131 and recover the amounts that already have been paid to the depen-
dents of the crew members under the ACA.4
1. The ACA
Section 5(1) outlines the statutory scheme as follows:
Subject to the provisions of this section, where any person suffers
34. No. 31, 17 N.Z. REPR. STAT. 809 (1936).
35. No. 35, 3 N.Z. REPiR STAT. 845 (1952).
36. See, eg., Collins v. Connolly & Anor, unreported opinion, A. 181/76 (High Court,
Rotorua Feb. 10, 1981).
37. Freedman, Why Not an Accident Compensation Act? Your Company Should Elect a
"No-fault"Modus Operandi, 1978 INs. Li. 511, 513.
38. ACA § 131.
39. Id § 105A.
40. See Vennell, supra note 4, at 296-97.
1983]
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personal injury by accident in New Zealand or dies as a result of
personal injury so suffered, or where any person suffers outside New
Zealand personal injury by accident in respect of which he had cover
under this Act or dies as a result of personal injury so suffered, no
proceedings for damages arising directly or indirectly out of the in-
jury or death shall be brought in any court in New Zealand indepen-
dently of this Act, whether under any rule of law or any enactment.41
Section 5(1) clearly abrogates the common-law right to bring proceed-
ings for the recovery of damages in New Zealand if there is ACA cov-
erage. This subsection, however, is qualified by section 5(3)(a) which
states: "Nothing in this section shall affect: Any action which lies in
accordance with section 131 of this Act.' 42 Under section 131(1) the
following test is laid down for determining whether or not a claim may
lie outside New Zealand:
In any case where a person suffers personal injury by accident either
within or outside New Zealand, or dies as a result of personal injury
so suffered, if the person has cover under this Act in respect of the
injury, and if under the law of the country in which he suffers the
injury, or under the law of any other country (except New Zealand),
or pursuant to any international agreement or convention or proto-
col, or any amendments thereto, a claim for damages or compensa-
tion in respect of the injury or death lies on behalf of the person, the
Commission may, in its discretion do all or any of the things speci-
fied in subsection 3 of this section.
43
If a personal injury or wrongful death occurs in New Zealand in an
accident to which the ACA applies, and if a claim for damages lies
under the law of any country except New Zealand, section 131(3) pro-
vides that the Accident Compensation Commission has the following
discretionary powers:
1. Deduct the amount payable under the Act, or recover from the
person to whom compensation has already been paid, from any
amount recovered by the enforcement of a claim under section
131. 44
2. Require that all reasonable steps to be taken to pursue the claim
for damages as a condition precedent to payment of compensa-
tion under the Act.45
3. The Commission may meet the whole or part of the costs in pur-
41. ACA § 5(1).
42. Id § 5(3)(a).
43. Id § 131.
44. Id § 131(3)(a).
45. Id § 131(3)(b).
[Vol. 7
Conflict of Laws
suing such a claim."
The drafters of this legislation clearly intended that persons recovering
under the ACA pursue claims available from other sources as a condi-
tion precedent to statutory compensation. In essence, section 13 1(3)(a)
gives the Commission a right of subrogation along with the discretion
under section 131(3)(c) to meet costs in pursuing concurrent claims.
In applying the section 131 test for bringing a claim in a foreign
court to the facts of Bennett, where the accident occurred in New Zea-
land with the claimant having coverage under the ACA, the question
turns on whether under the law of "any other country (except New
Zealand)" a claim for damages will lie. 7 Since this claim was brought
in Michigan where a claim for damages is actionable under the Michi-
gan Wrongful Death Statute,48 a claim for damages should lie under
Michigan law. Therefore, Bennett satisfies the statutory test of the New
Zealand ACA for bringing a claim in a foreign court.
Since the substantive law of New Zealand permits a common-law
claim in negligence only if the action is brought outside New Zealand,
which was the cause in Bennett, a negligence claim on the basis of the
lex loci delicti rule is permitted under section 131.
Since the lex loci delicti rule in Michigan prescribes that the sub-
stantive law of New Zealand be applied, the common-law claim in neg-
ligence that concurrently exists with the ACA must now be considered
since it is this remedy that was applicable in Bennett.
2. Common Law
Under common law, the general rule in a wrongful death case was
expressed in the maxim actiopersonalis moritur cum! persona:49 a per-
sonal action dies with the litigant. This rule was subsequently dis-
placed by the Law Reform Act (1936). 50  This "survival statute,"
46. Id § 131(3)(c).
47. This section is based on the "double actionability" principle of Boys v. Chaplin
[1971] A.C. 356. Under this principle, a claim for damages must be recognized in both the
country where the claim arose and in the country where the claim is brought.
48. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2922 (West 1982).
49. The origin of this rule in the English common law has been the subject of much
conjecture among legal writers, but it is generally agreed that it was during the time of Lord
Ellenborough that its usage originated in its modem form. See Holdsworth, The Origin of
the Rule in Baker v. Bolton, 32 L.Q. REv. 431 (1916); Smedley, 1frong/ul Death--Bases of the
Common Law Rules, 13 VAND. L. REv. 605 (1960); Winfield, Death as ,4ffecting Liability in
Tort, 29 COLUM. L. REv. 239, 244 (1929).
50. Section 3(1) of the Land Reform Act of 1936 provides: "Subject to the provisions of
this Part of this Act, on the death of any person after the passing of this Act all causes of
1983]
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modeled on the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1934
(U.K.),5 permitted the survival of rights of action which had vested in
the deceased during his or her lifetime for the benefit of his or her
estate.
In addition to the maxim actio personalis moritur cure persona,
there was also the accompanying principle, first expressed in Baker v.
Bolton,52 that the death of a human being could not be complained of
as an injury in a civil court. In Baker v. Bolton, a woman had died in a
stage coach accident. While her husband received damages for loss of
his wife's consortium up to the time of her death, he was unable to
recover for any subsequent loss. The Deaths by Accidents Compensa-
tion Act (1952) 53 created a right of action for dependents of the de-
ceased and specified the types of damages recoverable. This cause of
action was designed to compensate the dependents for the loss sus-
tained by the death of the deceased.
The Law Reform Act (1936) was subsequently amended by the
Statutes Amendment Act in 1937.14 This amendment abolished claims
by decedents' estates to recover damages for pain and suffering, for any
bodily or mental harm, or for the curtailment of life expectancy. In
1977, however, the Finance Act" repealed the Statutes Amendment
Act and revived the right to claim damages for loss of life expectancy. 6
An estate claim under the Law Reform Act (1936) supplements a
dependency claim under the Deaths By Accidents Compensation Act
(1952), although damages in an estate claim are taken into account in a
action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against or, as the case may be, for the
benefit of his estate."
51. 24 & 25 Geo. 5, ch. 41 (1934).
52. [1808] L. Camp. 493.
53. Section 4(1) of the Deaths by Accidents Compensation Act provides:
Where the death of a person is caused by any wrongful act, neglect, or default, and
the act, neglect, or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled
the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the
person who would have been liable if death had not ensued shall be liable to an
action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person injured, and although
the death was caused under such circumstances as to amount in law to a crime.
The Deaths By Accidents Compensation Act is based on Lord Campbell's Act (Fatal Acci-
dents Act), 1846, 9 & 10 Vict., ch. 93.
54. No. 38, 15 N.Z. REPR. STAT. 133, § 17 (1937).
55. No. 75, 2 N.Z. Stat. 939, § 19 (1977).
56. In the House of Lords case of Gammell v. Wilson [1981] 1 All E.R. 578, an award
was made for both loss of expectation of life and "lost years" (loss of earnings in the lost
years) in a claim under the Law Reform Act (1934 U.K.). See comment by Vennell, supra
note 4, at 295 (the writer maintains that under the present law in New Zealand, a court




dependency claim. In many cases, the dependents will also be the ben-
eficiaries of the estate, in which case both the dependency and estate
claims will proceed simultaneously in the same action.
This was the common-law basis of a negligence action in the case
of wrongful death at the time the ACA came into force in 1974. The
ACA added a series of significant amendments5 7 to the common-law
rules, but the ACA did not repeal these rules. The amendments pro-
vided that section 358 of the Law Reform Act (1936) and section 459 of
the Deaths By Accidents Compensation Act (1952) were subject to sec-
tion 5 of the ACA. In effect, section 5 of the ACA provided that any
action under the Law Reform Act (1936) or the Deaths By Accidents
Compensation Act (1952) could be brought only in a court outside New
Zealand where the plaintiff had coverage under the ACA. If there was
no coverage under the ACA61 the action could be brought in a court in
New Zealand.
3. Product Liability in New Zealand Based on Negligence
In New Zealand "product liability" is not a new tort in consumer
protection as it is in the United States.6 ' There is, nevertheless, com-
pensable redress for damage caused by defective products, in both tort
(based on negligence) and contract (breach of express or implied war-
ranty of fitness under the Sale of Goods Act (1908)).6
Any consideration of an action in negligence for defective prod-
ucts must begin with the words of Lord Aitkin in the celebrated case of
Donaghue v. Stevenson 63 where he stated:
... a manufacturer of products which he sells in such a form as to
show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the
form in which they left him with no reasonable possibility of inter-
mediate examination and with the knowledge that the absence of
57. See ACA Third Schedule.
58. See supra note 54.
59. See supra note 57.
60. For example, where excluded under § 105A of the ACA.
61. Tobin, Product Liability: A United States Commonwealth Comparative Survey, 3
N.Z.U.L. REv. 377 (1969). Tobin concludes that, in New Zealand, while in practice negli-
gence with res psa loquitur results in "de facto strict liability," there are still objections to the
present position that could only be alleviated by adopting strict liability. See also Wincup,
Consumer Protection--Products Liability, in THE IMPACT OF AMERICAN LAW ON ENGLISH
AND COMMONWEALTH LAW 107 (J. Elkind ed. 1978).
62. No. 168, 13 N.Z. REPR. STAT. 615 (1908). There is provision for redress in contract
by suing on the purchase contract, but since this Article is concerned with an action in tort,
this remedy has been excluded.
63. [1932] A.C. 562.
1983]
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reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will
result in any injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to
the consumer to take that reasonable care.
64
Under Lord Aitkin's test, the standard of care demanded from a manu-
facturer essentially amounted to strict liability by the application of the
principle of res ipsa loquitur. In other words, a manufacturer's negli-
gence is inferred from the injury caused by the defective product. This
was the approach of the Privy Council in the case of Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills,65 where Lord Wright stated: "Negligence is founded as
a matter of inference from the existence of the defects taken in connec-
tion with all the known circumstances; even if the manufacturers could
by apt evidence have rebutted that inference they have not done so."
'66
It should be mentioned that although the application of the princi-
ple of res Osa loquitur essentially amounts to strict liability,67 there is
an important difference between negligence with res psa loquitur and
strict liability. That difference is that negligence still applies a standard
of reasonableness.
New Zealand and other Commonwealth courts have applied the
principles laid down in Donaghue v. Stevenson and Grant v. Australian
Knitting Mills to cases involving defective food and drink,68 cosmet-
ics, 69 underwear,70 motor cars,71 elevators, 72 and sheep dip.73
Thus, applying Lord Aitkin's rule in order to sustain an action for
damages in a product liability case involving a defective aircraft, the
plaintiff would have to establish that there was a duty of care owed. It
is then likely that the court would apply the principle of res 01sa loqui-
tur and negligence would be inferred from the facts.
These principles are the basis upon which recovery should be de-
termined under the facts of Bennett. The question of the appropriate
64. Id at 599. 'This was sixteen years after similar words had been uttered by Justice
Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick Motors Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 389, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916).
65. [1936] A.C. 85.
66. Id at 101.
67. This concept is stated in section 402 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
(1966). For an account of the law relating to products liability in the United States see L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTs LIABILITY (1979).
68. Read v. Croydon Corp., [1938] 4 All E.R. 631; Barnes v. Irwell Valley, [1939] 1 K.B.
21.
69. Watson v. Buckley, [1940] All E.R. 147.
70. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A.C. 85.
71. Herschtal v. Stewart & Ardern, [1940] 1 K.B. 155.
72. Haseldine v. Daw, [1941] 2 K.B. 343.




quantum of damages, therefore, would have to be determined. Al-
though beyond the scope of this Article, a substantial body of law exists
on such issues as awarding of interest74 and the question of inflation 7"
in the awarding of lump sums in personal injury and wrongful death
cases.
The focus must now turn from the applicable New Zealand law to
a consideration of the application of foreign law76 by United States
federal courts. Certain statutory and procedural guidelines, along with
a series of judicial practices, assist the courts in applying foreign law
and now will be briefly considered.
IV. THE APPLICATION OF FOREIGN LAW IN
FEDERAL COURTS
Traditionally, under the Anglo-American common law doctrine,
an issue of foreign law was a question of fact and not of law." There-
fore, when foreign law was misapplied it was an error of fact and not of
74. The judge has a discretionary power to award interest on damages awards under
section 87 of the Judicature Act (1908) as amended by the Judicature Amendment Act
(1952), No. 89, 6 N.Z. REPR. STAT. 699 (1908). An award of interest was made under section
87 in Taurarga Harbour Board v. Clark, [1971] N.Z.L.R. 197.
75. The method of discounting, whereby the predicted rate of inflation is deducted from
the predicted rate of interest, has been used by the High Court of Australia in assessing lump
sum personal injury awards. Although a New Zealand court is not bound to follow these
decisions, it is likely that it would do so. See Barrell Ins. Party Ltd. v. Pennant Hills Restau-
rants Party Ltd., 55 AustL L.R. 258 (1981), and Todorovic & Another v. Waller, 56 Austl.
L.R. 59 (1981).
76. The term is used to refer to foreign country or alien law as distinct from sister state
law which, like treaty law, is domestic law. But see Burnett v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
368 F. Supp. 1152 (D.N.M. 1973). The court maintained that the French legal meaning was
to govern the interpretation of a provision of the Warsaw Convention on Private Interna-
tional Air Law. Although this was domestic law, the court held that it was determining a
question of foreign law and in this way Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 could be in-
voked. See infra note 85. Here, the court's use of the comparative method to interpret the
French legal meaning of the treaty provisions as a ground for invoking rule 44.1 is inconsis-
tent with the words of that rule which refer only to "foreign country" law. Use of the com-
parative method does not alter the basis of treaty law which is domestic law. See In re Air
Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 17 Av. L. REp. (CCH) 117,416 (9th Cir. 1982) (the court noted that
treaty provisions have the same effect as domestic law).
77. See, ag., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 38 (1801). In this early case the
Supreme Court held that foreign law had to be proved as a fact and could not be judicially
noticed. Id This same position was maintained over one hundred years later in Cuba R.R.
v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). See also Bridgman, Proof of Forelgn Law and Facts, 45 J.
AIR L. & CoM. 845 (1980); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the 'Fact'A4pproach to Determining
Foreign Law: Death Knellfor a Die-Hard Doctrine, 65 MICH. L Rv. 613 (1967); Peritz,
Determination of Foreign Law Under Rule 44.1, 10 Tax. IKT'L LI. 67 (1975); Sass, Foreign
Law in Civil Litigatio" A Comparative Survey, 16 AM. J. Comp. L 332 (1968).
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law and, as such, could not be reviewed on appeal. 8 While many
courts remedied this situation by applying a judicial "presumption of
law,"79 this rule has now been changed by statute.
By virtue of section 4.03 of the Uniform Interstate and Interna-
tional Procedure Act (1962),80 a court's determination of foreign law is
to be one of law and not fact and is subject to review on appeal.
Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure8 ' is modeled
after the Uniform Act and states, inter alia, that foreign law will be a
question of law and not of fact. As an aid to the determination, rule
44.1 prescribes minimum notice requirements of reliance on foreign
law,8 2 permits the court to carry out independent research,83 and sus-
pends the application of the Federal Rules of Evidence to Evidence of
the foreign law. While these provisions have not been uniformly inter-
preted, certain guidelines can be discerned from the decisions to date.
A. The Notice Requirement
With the abandonment of the fact doctrine foreign law no longer
must be pleaded like other facts.84 To prevent surprise, reasonable no-
tice of reliance on foreign law is required to be given by the party rely-
ing on it.85 What constitutes "reasonable notice" is determined by the
78. It could arguably give rise to an unjust enrichment claim under RESTATEMENT Or
RESTITUTION § 46(c) (1937); see E. SCOLES & P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 404 n.6 (1982).
79. E. SCOLES & HAY, supra note 78, at 404 n.9, 405 n.13.
80. 3 U.L.A. 459 (1980). See E. SCOLES & P. HAY, supra note 78, at 408 n.13.
81. 28 U.S.C. § 44.1 (1976). Rule 44.1 came into force in 1966 and was amended in
1972. The amended version which came into force in 1975 provides:
A party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall
give notice in his pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The court, in deter-
mining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testi-
mony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of
law.
82. See text accompanying notes 88-99; Fed. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee note.
83. See Pollack, Proof of Foreign Law, 20 AM. J. CoMP. L. 470 (1978); see infra text
accompanying notes 105-06; FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1 advisory committee note.
84. But see the decisions of the following two district courts sitting in Admiralty, Kear-
ney v. Savannah Foods & Indus. Inc., 350 F. Supp. 85 (S.D. Ga. 1970) and Micheal v. S,S,
Thanasis, 311 F. Supp. 170 (N.D. Cal. 1970). There is no reference in either case to rule
44.1, and both courts maintained that foreign law is still a question of fact and like other
facts must be pleaded and proved. But see Peritz, supra note 77, at 70-71. The writer prof-
fers as a possible explanation which the court could have relied on in the Micheal case, but
did not: since this was a proceeding in rem to which the Supplementary Rules for Certain
Admiralty and Maritime Claims applied, the standard of sufficiency under those rules for
foreign law could only be satisfied if the law was pleaded as a fact. Id
85. The Advisory Committee on Rules stated the following in regard to the first sen-
tence of Rule 44.1: "To avoid unfair surprise, the first sentence of the new rule requires that
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specificity of the contents and when it is given.
It has been held that such notice should be given in the district
court proceedings.86 This, however, has been referred to as a rule of
practice only.87 When notice is given in a brief, case law on reasona-
bleness of notice is unclear. While one district court held that it was
not sufficient notice to raise an issue of foreign law in the party's
brief,8  the Fifth Circuit in a subsequent case held that mention in the
brief was sufficient notice.8 9
Although the notice requirement is not a formal pleading require-
ment,90 it would be advisable to include notice of the alleged applica-
tion of foreign law in the complaint or the answer.
The specificity of the foreign law required of the written notice is
also a subject of uncertainty. While some courts have required that the
substance and alleged effect of foreign law be specified, 91 one court has
a party who intends to raise an issue of foreign law shall give notice thereof.., it shall be
written and reasonable. It may, but need not be, incorporated in the pleadings."
86. Ruffv. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 393 F.2d 500, 502 (2d Cir. 1968). The court held
that the reasonable notice requirement was not satisfied when an issue of foreign law was
not raised until the appellate leveL Id But see Peritz, supra note 77, at 72. The writer
maintains that neither the rule's text nor the Advisory Committee's notes limit the notice to
the pre-appellate stages of litigation. Id The notice of the intention to raise an issue of
foreign law is based on the same policy of notice vis-a-vis domestic law. Therefore, if rejec-
tion of an issue raised is a question of the court's discretion, it should not be treated differ-
ently. See also Bridgman, supra note 77, at 856 nA6. Subsequent cases are cited and
demonstrate liberal pre-trial treatment of foreign law problems. See, eg., First Nat'l Bank
v. British Petroleum Co., 324 F. Supp. 1348 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Koleinimport "Rotterdam"
N.V. v. Foreston Coal Export Corp., 283 F. Supp. 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (the parties were
invited to use the remaining time before judgment to plead Dutch law).
87. Green v. Brown, 398 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1968).
88. Modavelli v. Midland Mut. Ins. Co., 10 Ohio App. 2d 115, 226 N.E.2d 137 (1967).
The plaintiff did not plead Ontario law in the petition nor present evidence of such law at
the trial but cited a statute and court decision in the brief and in oral argument. 1d Contra,
Gadd v. Pearson, 351 F. Supp. 895 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The court gave a time period within
which the parties were to file memoranda and affidavits concerning an issue of foreign (Ba-
hamian) law. Id
89. First Nat'l City Bank v. Compania de Aguaceros, S.A., 398 F.2d 779, 781 (5th Cir.
1968).
90. FED. R. Crv. P. 8, 9. See Bridgman, supra note 77, at 855 n.41.
91. See, eg., Bryne v. Cooper, 11 Wash. App. 549, 523 P.2d 1216 (1974). The court
held that the notice of foreign law should be in the pleadings and should sufficiently reflect
the foreign law relied on so that the opponent can grasp the significance of the pleader's
claim. Id; see generally Bridgman, supra note 77, at 862. Bridgman states that there is a
minimum requirement for the party relying on foreign law. It must include citations to the
relevant statutory or decisional law. See Telesphore Couture v. Watkins, 162 F. Supp. 727
(E.D.N.Y. 1958); Taca Int'l Airlines v. Rolls Royce of Eng. Ltd., 47 Misc. 2d 771, 263
N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1965); see also Sass, supra note 77, at 100. Sass argues that the
specificity required of the written notice be determined by its function which is to prevent
surprise to the court and the adversary party. In this way, the amount of information re-
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held that the notice is not required to identify the substance of the for-
eign law.
92
Despite this lack of judicial consensus as to the requirement, it
would appear that if the basis of the alleged cause of action under for-
eign law is not identified in the pleadings93 or in an additional notice,
the action would be subject to a motion to dismiss for failing to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted under rule 12(b)(6) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.94 In addition, a motion for a more
definite statement under rule 12(e) may be made.95
B. Sources and Materials the Court May Use
Unconstrained by the Federal Rules of Evidence,96 courts have ac-
cepted expert testimony and affidavits of experts, 97 foreign texts and
treatises, 98 and even unauthenticated copies of foreign laws9 9 as
evidence.
The role of court and counsel is also somewhat uncertain. Under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1 the court may conduct its own
quired in the notice should depend on its timing. Thus, the later the notice is given, tile
more detailed the information should be. The notice should always identify the relevant
foreign law by adequately citing sources, and, if necessary, provide background information.
Id
92. Grice v. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels, 477 F. Supp. 365 (S.D. Ala. 1979). The court
recognized that determining the law of many foreign countries involved extensive research
that could not be contained within the law firm library and that research may extend to
university libraries, embassies, the offices of metropolitan practitioners, and often to the
members of the Bar of the foreign nation itself. The court, therefore, considered that it
would be unfair to hold the admiralty lawyer to a requirement of setting out the applicable
substantive law in the complaint, and added that this would be particularly unfair in a prac-
tice where lawyers are often hired one day before the statute of limitations runs out. Id
93. See supra note 85.
94. See 477 F. Supp. 365. The court held that to survive a rule 12(b)(6) motion, the
requirement under rule 44.1 falls short of identifying the substance of the applicable foreign
law. d; .see also C. WRIGHT, LAw oF FEDERAL COURTS, 314 (1976). Wright states that the
liberal rules as to the sufficiency of a complaint make it rare for a motion on this ground to
be granted.
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e); see Bridgman, stra note 77, at 863.
96. 28 U.S.C. Rules App. (1976 & Supp. V 1981) (enacted by Congress to govern the
proceedings in federal courts, effective Jan. 2, 1975).
97. See e.g. Noto v. Cia Secula di Armanento, 310 F. Supp. 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); In-
stituto per lo Sviluppo Economico v. Sperti Prod., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
98. See, e.g., Ramsay v. Boeing Co., 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970); Manos v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
99. Ramirez v. Autobus Flecha Roja, 486 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1973) (in the district court
proceedings, an unauthenticated copy of the Mexican Code was consulted); see Sass, supra
note 77, at 109.
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research. While there are instances of courts actually doing this,1c ° the
courts are generally reluctant to research foreign law.10 This is usually
considered to be the task of counsel who is required to argue and brief
a case involving foreign law in the same manner as domestic law.10 2 In
a series of appellate cases the federal courts have interpreted provisions
of foreign codes and statutes not previously judicially interpreted.
These cases indicate that in the interpretation and application of issues
of foreign law the courts have relied on some identifiable judicial
presumptions.
In First National City Bank v. Compania de Aguaceros, S.4. ,1o3 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the court has a duty to inter-
pret foreign law provisions even if they are ambiguous. The court was
guided in reaching its conclusion by decisions of the United States fed-
eral and state courts.1 4 InBamberger v. Clark,' the court disregarded
the view of an expert. 10 6 Guided by the language and apparent pur-
pose of the relevant provision of the German Civil Code the court in-
terpreted the foreign law provision, in the words of the court, "fairly in
accordance with the intention of the code."'0 7 When confronted with
the conflicting testimony of two experts, the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Ramsay v. Boeing Co. 108 gave its own interpretation of a provi-
sion of the Belgian Civil Code. The Belgian statute was another
provision that had not previously been litigated.
100. See, eg., Sass, supra note 77, at 109 n.59 (citing three district court decisions where
the court's research supplemented the parties' presentation of foreign law).
101. See, ag., Pollack, supra note 83, at 471. Pollack recognized that rule 44.1 expressly
authorized the court to do independent research into foreign law. The writer, a federal court
judge, concluded that "researching foreign law is not an appropriate way for federal judges
to spend their time." Id He also pointed out that when domestic law is applied, no matter
how uninformed and unhelpful the lawyers, the judge still has an obligation to apply the
governing law. On the other hand, if foreign law is not proved, it commonly results in the
application of local law. Id; see also Schlesinger, .4 Recurrent Problem in Transnational
Litigatior The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the ,4plicble Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL
L. REv. 1, 4 n.9 (1973).
102. Curtis v. Beatrice Foods Co., 481 F. Supp. 1275 (referring to the statement to that
effect in Pollack, supra note 83, at 475).
103. 398 F.2d 779 (5th Cir. 1968).
104. The court's findings were consistent with the expert's testimony.
105. 390 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
106. Id at 488. The expert maintained that the interpretation of the provision of the
code asserted by the plaintiff, could not be upheld on the grounds that no German court had
applied such an interpretation. The appellate court rejected this, and maintained that:
"even in precedent-oriented Anglo-American law, the lack of a precedent doing something
is hardly a precedent that it may not lawfully be done."
107. Id at 489.
108. 432 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1970).
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InManos v. Trans WorldAirlines,'019 the issue of foreign law before
the court was a manufacturer's liability to third parties for manufactur-
ing defects under the tort provisions of the Italian Civil Code. Assisted
by two expert witnesses and the only treatise on the subject, the court
recognized that tort liability under the code required the concurrence
of causation, negligence, and damage. The burden of proof was placed
on the plaintiff. The approach of the court was to adopt the test of
causation in a United States federal court decision" 0 because one of
the experts had identified the test as being analogous to that in Italian
law.
In Curtis v. Beatrice Foods Co., however, the court recognized
its power to reject the uncontradicted conclusions of an expert witness
and conducted its own examination of the authorities in a claim under
the Colombian Labor Code. The court relied on Colombian decisions
and did not rely on an extension of United States cases by analogy as
earlier courts had done.
These decisions suggest that the role of the expert witness, while
still important, is diminishing as more courts give recognition to the
mandate in rule 44.1 that foreign law be determined as law and not as
fact. Courts are now freely engaging in statutory interpretation rather
than relying on the interpretation of the expert. Clearly, a judicial
practice has developed. Courts identify analogous domestic principles
and then apply them to foreign law issues.
In light of the foregoing it appears that the Bennett court, by fail-
ing to interpret the statutory provisions of the ACA and instead un-
questionably relying on the testimony of an expert, rendered a
judgment that was more in line with the "fact" than the "law" doctrine
of foreign law determination. The Sixth Circuit failed even to mention
the private international law provisions embodied in section 131 of the
ACA. Had it done so, it would have realized the inaccuracies in the
expert's statement on which the final judgment of the court was
premised.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to illustrate that the ACA is not an ex-
clusive remedy in a wrongful death action. The ACA left areas of
"residual liability" and for the reasons discussed, Bennett v. Enstrom
109. 324 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
110. Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310 (9th Cir. 1961).
111. 481 F. Supp. 1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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Helicopter Corp. is an example of one category of such liability. The
ACA left the common-law tort of negligence intact if there is no cover-
age under the ACA, or if there is coverage but the right to bring pro-
ceedings in a foreign court is not precluded. It is submitted that this is
the appropriate "substantive law" of New Zealand, applicable as for-
eign law in Bennett and, therefore, should have been applied under the
ex loci delicti rule.

